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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in not requiring the

prosecutor to state the reason for his peremptory challenge of
the only minority venireman, where it facially appeared that
the venireman was well qualified to serve and the basis for the
challenge was his Hispanic status?
2.

Was the evidence insufficient to convict Mr, Cantu

of the three offenses?
3.

Did the trial court err in allowing the charge of

aggravated robbery to be submitted to the jury where there was
no evidence that any taking or attempted taking was
accomplished by force or fear or that any taking was from the
person or immediate presence of the victim?
4.

Did the trial court err in giving a parties

instruction where the evidence was that either Mr. Cantu was
himself the victim's attacker or that he was not present in her
home at that time?
5.

Did the court err in not modifying or arresting

judgment when before sentencing it was determine that Mr. Cantu
is mentally ill?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent

:

vs.

:

JUAN de DIOS CANTU,

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 860052
Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Juan de Dios Cantu, appeals from a
judgment and conviction imposed for Aggravated Robbery, a First
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953
as amended); Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1953 as amended) and
Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann §76-5-103 (1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge presiding.

Statement of Facts
In the early morning hours of December 22, 1984, sixty
eight year old Adelia Pippy was awakened when her pillow was
removed from beneath her head.

A man then pulled her out of

bed and demanded money (T. 228). Mrs. Pippy said she saw an
unidentifiable form of another man standing in her darkened
bedroom (T. 231). Mrs. Pippy described the voice of her
assailant as cold and deliberate but did not notice any kind of

accent (T. 282). Mrs. Pippy was then struck with a club on the
head, pushed onto the bed and stabbed (T. 233).
Items were taken from throughout the house but Mrs.
Pippy testified that she heard nothing being taken after the
men left her bedroom (T. 278). No items were taken from her
bedroom (T. 247, 363). After an hour or so Mrs. Pippy made her
way to a neighbor's house (T. 243), the police were called and
Mrs. Pippy was taken to the hospital.
When police came to investigate the crime, they found
a jacket near the kitchen that later was determined to belong
to the Appellant.

The jacket and items in the kitchen had

blood stains which a witness testified were consistent with
Mrs. Pippy's blood type (T. 416). No fingerprints of the
Appellant were found anywhere in the house except on items
found inside one of the coat pockets. None of these items
belonged to Mrs. Pippy (T. 444). A fingerprint found in the
home was not matched with any suspect (T. 436).
Salt Lake City Police Officer Mike Hanks, who arrived
quickly on the crime scene, followed footprints from Mrs.
Pippy's house to a house in which a Miquel Marcus was staying
(T. 463). From conflicting statements given him, Officer Hanks
formed an opinion that Miguel Marcus had something to do with
the crime (T. 467). No attempt was made to check his juvenile
record (T. 535) or secure a photograph of Marcus to show to
Mrs. Pippy (T. 547).
Mrs. Pippy later described her assailant as dark
complected with normal length hair and no beard (T. 285, 292,
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296) and having no accent (T. 282). Oclries Chacon testified
that Appellant at the time of the crime had long hair and a
beard (T. 474). The trial court noted that Mr. Cantu spoke
with a discernible Hispanic accent (T. 758).
During the investigation, Mrs. Pippy was shown an
array of photographs and according to Detective John Lomax,
Mrs. Pippy indicated that she thought Appellant, whose picture
was in the group, was her assailant (T. 527). The officer
testified that he commented to Mrs. Pippy that she had
identified the suspect and that she had expressed relief for
having picked the right man (T. 527).
At a 1:00 p.m. lineup on August 13, 1985, Mrs. Pippy
failed to identify Mr. Cantu, assuring the prosecutor and
defense counsel that she did not believe the face of her
assailant was among those eight men (Addendum A, p. 26). At a
2:00 p.m. Preliminary Hearing the same day, Mrs. Pippy pointed
at Appellant, who sat isolated at counsel table, unhesitatingly
identified him as her attacker and stated that she would never
forget his face (T. 337). She attempted to justify her
non-selection minutes earlier by saying that she had been told
at the lineup that she needed to be absolutely sure before
making an identification but the record of the lineup disputes
this.

(T. 333 See Addendum A and Exhibit 26, lineup card).
During voir dire at trial Appellant made a motion to

quash the jury panel or in the alternative to supplement the
venire with minorities because no minority venireperson had
been summoned (T. 72). The trial court instructed the jury
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clerk to call two minority venirepersons to supplement the
venire in this trial (T. 160). One of these minorities was Mr.
James Lopez.

Mr. Lopez, who appeared to be in his thirties, is

L.D.S., married, has a steady job, studied at L.D.S. Business
College, and has two children (T. 179). He lived within blocks
of another juror who sat on the case. The other specially
called venireperson was not in fact a minority member and was
subsequently excused for cause (T. 192). Mr. Lopez was
peremptorally challenged by the prosecution and Appellant's
counsel objected to this peremptory challenge as having been
used in a discriminatory fashion (T. 201). Appellant's counsel
also made a motion to have the prosecutor testify to have him
state under oath whether the Hispanic origin of Mr. Lopez was
the reason the prosecutor struck Mr. Lopez (T. 201). The
prosecutor, David Walsh, objected to the motion and the court
ruled that the law did not allow him to make such inquiry and
the prosecutor could use his peremptory challenges as he chose
(T. 203). A motion for mistrial on the basis of using "an
illegal, inappropriate, racial racist (sic) method to select
the jury" was denied by the court (T. 203).
During the course of the trial Appellant's counsel
showed Mrs. Pippy a photo and asked if she recognized the man.
Mrs. Pippy handed counsel a photo and said, "This is the man"
(T. 300). The photo was not of the Appellant and when pressed
further a perturbed, frustrated Mrs. Pippy replied that the
photo was of a man she had seen on the street (T. 301).

- 4 -

During the trial Mr. Cantu testified that he had
indeed entered Mrs. Pippy's house earlier with two others,
Irene Garcia and Jeremy Garcia, looking for a warmer coat (T.
583).

He believed that the house was empty as he had not seen

a car at the house or lights on in the dwelling (T. 584). Mr.
Cantu testified that he heard snoring and encouraged the others
to leave, and that all left (T. 588). Appellant also testified
that later in the evening two other people he knew decided to
return to Mrs. Pippy's house to steal items left behind (T.
597).

Mr. Cantu swore that he never returned to Mrs. Pippy's

house after his earlier entry, when he stole a warmer coat (T.
597).
At the end of the evidence the trial court allowed a
parties instruction (Jury Instruction No. 28) over the
objection of Appellant's counsel (T. 649).
After Mr. Cantu was convicted but prior to sentencing,
Appellant's counsel made a motion to arrest judgment under Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-23 (1982 Supp.) because Dr. Breck LeBegue had
examined Mr. Cantu and had found him to be mentally ill (R.
132).

The court had appointed Dr. LeBegue as alienist at

defense counsel's request because of her increasing concerns
that Mr. Cantu was not well (R. 137, See Addendum B ) . When the
court refused to arrest judgment, Appellant's counsel asked the
court to modify the verdicts from guilty to guilty and mentally
ill (T. 720). The court also denied this motion and sentenced
Appellant to five years to life for each of the two first
degree felonies and zero to five for the third degree felony.

- 5
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The first argument presented on appeal involves the
trial court's error in not requiring the prosecutor to explain
his peremptory challenge of the lone minority venireperson and
denying the motion for mistrial.

The prosecutor's use of the

peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner violated
Appellant's right to a trial by a jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community.
The second argument is that insufficient evidence was
presented on the three charged offenses introduced at trial to
find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The third issue on appeal is that the trial court
committed error in allowing the charge of aggravated robbery to
go to the jury where no property was taken from the person or
immediate presence of the victim.
The fourth point is that the court committed error in
giving the parties instruction (Jury Instruction No. 28) when
the state's case rested on the victim's eyewitness
identification of Mr. Cantu as the man who assaulted her. No
evidence was introduced that put the Appellant in the victim's
house at the time of the assault other than the eyewitness
identification which would make Appellant a principal.
Finally, Mr. Cantu contends that the trial court erred
in not modifying or arresting judgment when Dr. LeBegue
testified that the Appellant was mentally ill prior the
imposition of sentence.

- 6 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR MISTRIAL AFTER THE PROSECUTOR USED A PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE TO STRIKE A HISPANIC VENIRE PERSON AND NOT
REQUIRING THE PROSECUTOR TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTION.
During voir dire the prosecutor peremptorally
challenged Mr. John Lopez, a venire-person who objectively was
satisfactory but, like Appellant, he is a Hispanic.
Appellant's counsel asked the trial court to order the
prosecutor to testify to state whether the reason he struck Mr.
Lopez was his Hispanic origin (T. 201). The prosecutor
objected and the trial court refused to make the inquiry (T.
201).

Appellant moved for a mistrial on the basis that the

prosecutor had used "an illegal method, an inappropriate,
racial, racist method to select the jury" (T. 203). The motion
was denied.

Mr. Lopez, specially added to the venire over the

state's objection, as a minority representative, was the sole
racial minority on the venire.
Recently the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky,
84-6263, 39 Cr. L. 3061 (April 30, 1986) held that a state
denies a black defendant equal protection when it puts him on
trial before a jury from which members of his race have been
purposefully excluded.

The Court also held that a defendant

may now establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's
exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial.
This decision reaffirmed the principle of Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 503 (1880) where the U.S. Supreme Court
- 7

-

held thab a state denied a black defendant equal protection
when Blacks had been excluded from the venire.

The court said,

however, that a defendant has "no right to a petit jury
composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race."
Strauder at 305. Strauder showed that the Supreme Court was
concerned with racial discrimination in the selection of jury
venires as have other cases of discrimination in selection of
the jury panel. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975),
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), was a case in
which the prosecutor used six peremptory challenges to strike
the six black persons in the venire.

The Supreme Court held

the state may not exercise its peremptory challenges to exclude
Blacks from the jury "for reasons wholly unrelated to the
outcome of the particular case on trial" or to deny to Blacks
"The same right and opportunity to participate in the
administration of justice enjoyed by the White population."
Swain at 224. The Swain Court required, however, that the
defendant show the peremeptory challenge system as a whole was
being perverted and required a showing of systematic abuse by a
prosecutor in more than one case.

In this case evidence was

presented on Mr. Cantu's behalf that during the three month
period, January - March 1983, in every instance in which a
venireperson with an Hispanic surname was removed by a
peremptory challenge in Third District Court criminal cases, it
was the prosecution that removed him or her (T. 312). Batson,
however, specifically overturned that evidentiary burden and
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ruled that a defendant may show purposeful racial
discrimination based solely on evidence concerning a
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the
defendant's trial.
Batson sets out a two-step process by which a
defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination by the prosecutor in the use of his peremptory
challenges.

First, the defendant must show that he is a member

of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant's race.

The defendant may also rely

on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury
selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are
of a mind to discriminate.

39 Cr. L. 3066.

Second, the

defendant must show that such facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used
peremptory challenges to exclude veniremen from the petit jury
on account of their race.

Once a defendant has made a prima

facie showing of racial discrimination the burden shifts to the
state to offer a neutral explanation for challenging the
jurors.

The Court stated that a prosecutor may not rebut a

prima facie showing by saying that he challenged the jurors on
the assumption that they would be partial to the defendant
because of the their shared race.
In this case the Appellant, Juan Cantu, is a Hispanic
and thus is a member of a cognizable racial group, per the
United States Census Bureau (See Addendum C) and United States
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v, Testy 550 F. 2d 577 (10th Circuit 1976).

The prosecutor in

this case used a peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Lopez, a
venireperson who while Hispanic was in every way qualified to
serve on the petit jury (T. 194). Mr. Lopez lives within
blocks of another juror who the prosecutor let sit on the jury
(T. 190). Lopez is LDS, studied accounting at LDS Business
College, is married and has a steady job (T. 179). These facts
ought to raise an inference that the prosecutor in this case
used his peremptory challenge to remove Mr. Lopez solely on
account of his race. Appellant objected to the prosecutor's
removal of Mr. Lopez (T. 201) and asked the judge to require
the prosecutor to state under oath his reason for striking Mr.
Lopez.

The prosecutor, David Walsh, objected and the trial

court refused to make such inquiry, as in Batson.
While this case involves striking only one Hispanic
and Batson involved striking four black persons on the venire,
the fact that so few Hispanics are included in jury venires in
Salt Lake County requires that prosecutors be barred from using
racially motivated grounds for striking any venireperson.

The

trial court heard evidence that only 2.16% of venirepersons in
all criminal trials in Salt Lake County from January through
March 1983 had Spanish surnames while Hispanics represented
4.98% of the population at that time (T. 92).
Some states have held that the use of peremptory
challenges by the prosecution to exclude persons from a petit
jury on the basis of race deprived defendants of their right to
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trial by jury drawn fairly from the community.

In Commonwealth

v. Soares, 387 N. E. 2d 499 (Mass. 1979), a case in which a
prosecutor peremptorily challenged twelve of thirteen black
members of the venire, the court held that such a systematic
use of peremptory challenges in a case denied a defendant his
right to trial by a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community.
In People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (1978) the Supreme
Court of California held that a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to remove each and every Black from the jury
violated the defendant's right to a jury drawn from a
respesentative cross-section of the community.

In the instant

case the prosecutor struck without legitimate cause the only
Hispanic and thus the Appellant's right under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution to a trial by an
impartial jury was violated.
This court quoted People v. Wheeler in State v. Ball,
685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984) which reversed a conviction for
Driving Under the Influence:
We agree with the California Supreme
Court, which said: In practice, a party
will use a peremptory challenge only when
he believes that the juror he removes may
be consciously or unconsciously biased
against him, or that his successor may be
less biased.
To say that peremptories will ordinarily
be exercised only in cases of bias,
however, does not clarify the kinds of
bias upon which the challenge may
permissibly be based. In contrast to the
limited list of events authorizing a
challenge for cause on the ground of
- 11 -

implied bias (Pen. Code, §1074), the law
recognizes that a peremptory challenge may
be predicated on a broad spectrum of
evidence suggestive of juror partiality.
The evidence may range from the obviously
serious to the apparently trivial, from
the virtually certain to the highly
speculative.
By contrast, when a party presumes that
certain jurors are biased merely because
they are members of an identifiable group
distinguished on racial, religious,
ethnic, or similar grounds—we may call
this "group bias"—and peremptorily
strikes all such persons for that reason
alone, he not only upsets the demographic
balance of the venire but frustrates the
primary purpose of the representative
cross-section requirement. That purpose,
as we have seen is to achieve an overall
impartiality by allowing the interaction
of the diverse beliefs and values the
jurors bring from their group
experiences. Manifestly if jurors are
struck simply because they may hold those
very beliefs, such interaction becomes
impossible and the jury will be dominated
by the conscious or unconscious prejudices
of the majority. Seen in this light, the
presumed group bias that triggered the
peremptory challenges against its members
is indistinguishable from the group
perspective we seek to encourage by the
cross-section rule.
People v. Wheeler, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
901-903, 583 P.2d at 760-761 (footnotes
omitted).
Ball at 1059.
In this case, in light of Mr. Lopez' voir dire responses, and
all other known information, it seems that the only reason Mr.
Lopez was stricken was because he is a Hispanic, and therefore,
unacceptable to the state's attorney who was prosecuting a
Hispanic and whose victim is white.

An all-white jury assures

the prosecutor that the defendant is perceived as different
from them and enhances the likelihood that jury members will
identify with the white victim, a very real advantage to the
state.
i r\

Group bias should not be used as a legitimate reason
to peremptorily challenge a potential juror.

The consequence

of this process is that prosecutors are allowed to have jurors
whom they expect will be inherently suspect of a minority
defendant, if not consciously or unconsciously biased against
him.

In fact the Salt Lake County Attorney Trial Manual

published in 1978 advises prosecutors that minorities per se
are poor jurors for blue collar crimes but good for white
collar crimes (Addendum D ) .

Because the number of minorities

who are called to jury duty is very small, almost never more
than one per panel, the four peremptories granted the state
will always be sufficient to remove every minority venireperson.
In this case Appellant met the evidentiary burden of
Batson and this case should therefore be reversed and remanded
for a new trial, unless arguments in other points warrant
reversal and cause the court to enter a verdict of guilty of
Burglary, a felony of the second degree.

Limiting the

prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to preclude racial
discrimination will not undermine the legitimate exercise of
peremptory challenges.

If a prosecutor can provide a neutral

explanation for challenging racial minorities, , those
challenges should be allowed.

Because facially the stricken

venireperson was excluded solely because of his race, the
prosecutor would not disclose the reason for the challenge, and
the court would not order it, this Court must conclude that
these facts in conjunction with Batson require a reversal of
the convictions.
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POINT II
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED BY THE
STATE TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The jury found the Appellant guilty of aggravated
robbery, aggravated burglary and aggravated assault (R.
32-34).

The evidence which was presented at trial was

insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Mr. Cantu asserted throughout the trial that

while he had been in the victim's home earlier in the evening
that he had left when he heard snoring and that he knew others
had returned (T. 597). He admitted taking a coat from the
victim's home because his was not warm enough (T. 583). The
only evidence placing the Appellant in the victim's home at the
time of the attack was the victim's identification and that
identification was so faulty that it does not support the
verdict.
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444 (1983) this
Court stated " . . . notwithstanding the presumptions in favor
of the jury decision this court still has the right to review
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict."
Court also noted:
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence (viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict) is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime for which he was
convicted. Id. (Citations omitted).
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The

In State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 234-235 (1980) the
dissent noted:
If the circumstances essential for conviction
are ambiguous and consistent with the
innocence of the accused, then this court must
hold as a matter of law that there is no
substantial evidence to support the guilt of
the accused.
This standard is in accordance with the Due Process
requirements which prohibit a criminal conviction in all cases
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which a defendant is
charged.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence
presented to place him at the home of the victim at the time of
the assault.

The only evidence which exclusively supported

that proposition was the identification of the victim, Adelia
PipPY/ an elderly woman in her bed in a darkened bedroom in
the middle of the night (T. 229).
The problems inherent in eyewitness identification
have been the subject of much discussion.

The late Felix

Frankfurter, former Supreme Court Justice said:
What is the worth of identification
testimony even when uncontradicted? The
identification of strangers is proverbially
untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony
are established by a formidable number of
instances in the records of English and
American trials. These instances are recent
— not due to the brutalities of ancient
criminal procedure . . . .
Evidence as to identity based on personal
impressions, however bona fide, is perhaps of
all classes of evidence the least to be relied
- 15 -

upon and therefore, unless supported by other
facts, an unsafe basis for the verdict of a
jury. Frankfurter, The Trial of Sacco and
Vanzetti.
The unreliability of eyewitness identification has
been well documented in numerous law review articles in recent
years.1

Ipid Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev.
969 (1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 (1978);
Eyewitness Identification Evidence; Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. Ky.
L. Rev. 407 (1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental Studies of
Face Identification 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Use of
Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 Crim. L.Q.
361 (1979). Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Public Defender
Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 1976); Yarmey, The Psychology
of Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Buckhout, Determinants of Eyewitness
Performance on a Lineup, 1974 Bull. Psychonomic Soc'y 191; Buckhout,
Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in the Courtroom, Crim.
Def., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 5-9; Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony,
Scientific Am., Dec. 1974, at 23; Ellis, Davies & Shepherd,
Experimental Studies of Face Identification, Nat'l J. Crim. Def. 219
(1977); Levin & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification:
The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1079 (1973); Luce,
The Neglected Dimension in Eyewitness Identification, Crim., Def.,
May-June 1977, at 5-8; Tyrrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness
Credibility: Adjusting the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law.
563, 575-85 (1976).
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Thus the Appellant contends that the evidence in this
trial suggested that it was "inherently improbable" that he
committed the crime.

The victim failed to identify Mr. Cantu

in an eight-person lineup, at which the participants stood,
walked, turned, and then spoke the phrase Mrs. Pippy remembered
her assailant having said.

She remarked that she did not

believe the face of the man who hurt her was there (Addendum A,
p. 26). However, one hour later, at the Preliminary Hearing,
with Appellant seated alone next to defense counsel, Mrs. Pippy
pointed at him, identified him, and shouted, "I'll never forget
his face" (T. 337). At Preliminary Hearing and at Trial the
victim claimed that the reason she failed to indicate that she
recognized anyone in the linup was because she was not one
hundred percent certain (T. 334). Yet, at the linup she was
asked only if she recognized anyone to which she replied that
she did not.

(See Addendum A, lineup transcript).

In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) the
Supreme Court set a standard for evaluating pretrial
photographic identifications which are allegedly "unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to misidentification "

The Supreme

Court stated:
. . . each case must be considered on its
own facts, and that convictions based on
eyewitness idenfication at trial following a
pretrial identification by photograph will
be set aside on that ground only if the
photographic identification procedure was so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to
a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.
390 U.S. at 384.
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The Court also stated in that case:
. . • The chance of misidentification is
also heightened if the police indicate to
the witness that they have other evidence
that one of the persons pictured committed
the crime. Regardless of how the initial
misidentification comes about, the witness
thereafter is apt to retain in his memory
the image of the photograph rather than of
the person actually seen, reducing the
trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or
courtroom identification.
Ld. at 383-384.
In this case after the victim had said that she
believed that a photograph of the Appellant was that of her
assailant, a police officer indicated that she had indeed
identified the suspect in the case (T. 527). The victim then
expressed relief that she had picked the right one.

In this

case the victim, who had been unable to identify Mr. Cantu in a
lineup, did pick out a photo that she thought was her assailant
(T. 527). However, the victim's identification was so shaky
that Detective John Lomax, police officer in charge of the
investigation, said that he would not have tried to get a
criminal complaint on her identification alone (T. 526).
The victim indicated in her initial description that
the assailant did not have long hair or a beard yet testimony
of Oclries Chacon indicated that Mr. Cantu had long hair and a
beard at the time of the attack and that he usually had a beard
and long hair (T. 474). At the lineup that is how he appeared
and the victim, Mrs. Pippy, was unable to identify him (T. 331).
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The array of photographs shown to her by Detective
Lomax was also impermissibly suggestive in that four of the six
photos were of men with long hair while the victim's
description of the assailant was clearly that he had "normal"
hair (T. 302). In this case Mr. Cantu normally wore his hair
long and the reason the victim was shown a photo of him with
short hair was because the photo was taken while the Appellant
was in custody for an unrelated matter and short hair was
required by the institution.
During trial Appellant's cousel showed the victim the
only other photo of a man with short hair from the original
photo array.

The victim looked at the photo and said, "This is

the man" (T. 300). The victim further stated she thought the
picture was of Mr. Cantu (T. 300). The photo she identified
was not of the Appellant and when Appellant's counsel expressed
surprise, the victim retreated and tried to explain away her
choice with the implausible statement that she meant this was
just a man she had seen on the street (T. 300) (See Addendum
F).

This does not seem a logical response during trial

questioning on the identity of her attacker and shows the
inconsistencies and the doubt of the victim's identification of
Mr. Cantu as her assailant.

Mrs. Pippy also said her attacker

had no accent (T. 282), yet the court noted for the record that
the Appellant has a Spanish accent (T. 758).
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This Court stated in State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349,
1352 (1979):
But the circumstances of the individual case
should be scrutinized carefully by the trial
court to see whether in the identification
procedures there was anything done which
should be regarded as so suggestive or
persuasive that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the identification was not a
genuine product of the knowledge and
recollection of the witness, but was
something so distorted or tainted that in
fairness and justness the guilt or innocence
of an accused should not be allowed to be
tested thereby.
In this case there is a reasonable likelihood that the
victim's identification was not a genuine product of her
knowledge and recollection but was instead based on an improper
photo lineup,

Mr. Cantu's photo had been logically included

because his identification had been found in a jacket left in
the home sometime that evening; however, hair length, rather
than facial features, was a critical characteristic of the
attacker and it was improper to have included primarily men
with longer hair, who were perfunctorily excluded from
consideration, enhancing the probability that Appellant or the
one remaining short-haired subject would be selected.

As one

might expect from this unfortunately capricious yet determined,
angry victim, at trial her fundamental doubt about who attacked
her caused her to select the other short-haired man's photo as
the assailant, retreating only after the cross-examination
pointed out what she had done.
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Another weakness in the state's case concerned the
testimony of officer Hanks who stated that he had
conscientiously followed the footprints left in the snow from
the victim's house to a house in which Miguel Marcus was
staying (T. 463). These footprints were in the opposite
direction from Appellant's house (T. 451). Officer Hanks
testified that he felt that Marcus had something to do with the
crime (T. 467). Yet the investigating officer, Detective
Lomax, did not follow up on this investigation by Officer
Hanks.

No check was made to see if Marcus had any police or

juvenile record and no attempt was made to show the victim any
photo of Marcus.

This physical evidence suggests that the

Appellant's version of what happened that night is entirely
reasonable and that considering all the circumstances, there
was insufficient evidence that Juan Cantu was in the home at
the time of the attack.
Given the limited physical description the victim was
able to provide (which suggests an unreliability of any
subsequent identification), the suggestive photographic array,
the confirming statement by the police officer after her
selection of Appellant, the failure of the victim to identify
or recognize Appellant at an in-person lineup (after watching
him and hearing him speak), her brazen selection of him in
isolation as the defendant in a Preliminary Hearing an hour
later, and her initial identification of another man's photo at
trial as her attacker, it is clear that this elderly victim did
not really know at all who had attacked her, but had relied
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upon statements by police and the fact that the state had
charged Mr. Cantu on her compelling but inaccurate statement,
"I'll never forget his face."

Petree ought to compel this

Court to find the evidence insufficient to convict of
aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary and aggravated assault,
and order judgment entered, if appropriate, for burglary under
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended).
POINT III
THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY SHOULD NOT
HAVE GONE TO THE JURY SINCE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS
WERE NOT PROVEN.
The Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, a
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended).

That

statute reads:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in
the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the
first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act
shall be deemed to be 'in the course of
committing a robbery1 if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of,
or in the immediate flight after the attempt
or commission of a robbery.
The robbery statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 (1953 as amended)
states, "Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of
personal property in the possession of another from his person
or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means
of force or fear."
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The elements that must be proved, then, for aggravated
robbery are:

(1) that there was an intentional taking of

personal property; (2) that the property was in the victim's
possession; (3) that the taking was from the victim's person or
immediate presence; (4) that the taking was accomplished by
means of force or fear; and (5) that during the course of
committing the robbery, the perpetrator used a firearm, knife,
deadly weapon, or facisimile thereof, or caused serious bodily
injury upon another.

The evidence presented at trial did not

establish each of these necessary elements.
At trial no evidence was presented that anything was
taken from the person of the victim or from her immediate
presence by means of force or fear.

This case can be

distinguished from this court's holding in State v. Ulibarri,
668 P.2d 568 (1983).

In that case a person leaving a store was

stopped by a clerk and asked to pay for beer.

The defendant in

that case then put his hand in his pocket, acted as a gunman
and said, "Everything's cool, hold it there or I'll blow you
away."

in Ulibarri this court held that when the owner of a

premises takes precautions against thievery and his opposition
is overcome as he interposes himself to prevent the theft, the
use of force concurrent or concomitant with the taking
constituted robbery.

In Uliberri the theft occurred in the

presence of the victim which distinguishes it from the present
case.
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In this case any taking occurred in the other rooms of
the home, not in the bedroom where the victim was assaulted,
and Mrs. Pippy was unaware of such taking (T. 241). The victim
also testified that she heard no sounds from other parts of her
home after she was attacked (T. 278).
In considering the forceful taking element,
commentators provide this insight: " The offense is robbery
only if the force, actual or constructive, is part of the res
gestae of the larceny."

(citations omitted.)

Wharton's Criminal Law, 12th Ed., Robbery §559 says:
Robbery is not committed when the victim is
not aware that the defendant has taken the
victim's property until after the defendant
has done so and is leaving.
When the defendant is able to take
possession of the property without the use
of force or fear but then employs force or
fear in order to keep the property or to
effect his escape, it is generally held that
his offense is not robbery. (citations
omitted.)
State v. Aldershorf, 556 P.2d 371 (Kansas 1976) noted
Wharton's observations that there was conflict in some states
because of the uncertainty as to when the taking is completed.
Some cases have held that the snatching of
property from the presence of an owner or his
agent and a use of force or intimidation in
carrying it away constitutes robbery, usually
on the theory that the taking was not effected
until the property was carried away, and any
violence used in making an escape after the
snatching was in effect violence in the
taking. The problem raised by these cases has
been met in some jurisdictions by statutes
which define robbery so as to include the use
of force to resist the retaking of the
property. (citations omitted.)
556 P.2d at 374. Ulibarri, a per curiam opinion muddied this
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issue in Utah because it held that if force is used to prevent
the retaking of property, a robbery has occurred, despite the
language of Utah's robbery statute that does not include force
in the retaking as robbery.
The Aldershorf court then laid down this test:
"We believe that the test should be whether or
not the taking of the property has been
completed at the time the force or threat is
used by the defendant. This must of necessity
be determined from the factual circumstances
presented in the particular caes before the
court."
556 P.2d at 375.
In this case no force was used against the victim in
order to take items from her home by means of force or fear.
Neither was there any attempt to take by force such items.

The

victim was assaulted and asked if she had any gold or silver.
When she replied that she did not she was beaten, apparently in
anger and frustration.

Any taking occurred before the assault

of the victim (as she remained conscious and heard nothing from
the other rooms afterwards) and no effort was made by the
victim to prevent the taking.

This case is clearly different

than Ulibarri in that nothing was taken from the victim's
presence.Therefore neither a robbery nor aggravated robbery
occurred.

The jury showed its concern in this regard by asking

for a definition of immediate presence (T. 713).
Thus it was error to allow the charge of aggravated
robbery to go to the jury as an essential element was not
proven.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN AIDING AND
ABETTING INSTRUCTION WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
OF SUCH ACTIVITY.
Appellant admitted during the trial that he had
entered the home of the victim earlier in the evening
of the attack (T. 583). He admitted leaving his coat there
because he needed a warmer coat.
presented that

However no evidence was

Juan Cantu was present in the house at the

time of the assault other than the victim'a unreliable
eyewitness identification.
in State v. Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 881, 495 P.2d 808
(1972) this court stated that it was prejudicial error to give
an aiding and abetting instruction where there was no evidence
of aiding and abetting.

Although that case was decided before

the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1978), this court in
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (1982) reaffirmed the rule
that "it is prejudicial error to give an aiding and abetting
instruction if there is no evidence of such activity" 652 P.2d
at 945.
In this case the only evidence placing the Appellant
in the victim's house at the time of the assault was the
victim's eyewitness testimony.

If the Appellant was the person

the victim saw then he would have to be guilty as a principal
and not one who is criminally liable as an aider and abettor.
Appellant's counsel made a timely objection (T. 649) to the
aiding and abetting instruction (Jury Instruction No. 28) which
was given to the jury (Addendum E).
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In State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980) this
court defined an accomplice as "one who is also criminally
liable for the conduct charged."

Jj3. at 1166.

In state v.

Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972) this court said:
...Furthermore, mere presence combined with
knowledge that a crime is about to be
committed where the person contributes
nothing to the doing of the act, will not of
itself constitute one an accomplice.
Id. at 665.
In this case although Appellant might have known that
others were going back to Mrs. Pippy's home to steal property,
as his testimony indicated, he did nothing to instigate,
encourage or assist anyone in committing the crime, and refused
to leave his house to go with them (T. 597).
In State v. Kerekes, this court stated:
Nevertheless, even if one has lent aid and
encouragement, voluntary abandonment of his
participation prior to the commission of the
crime relieves him of criminal liability for
its commission providing the abandonment was
communicated to the remaining parties and
occurred prior to a time when the crime had
become so inevitable that its commission
could not reasonably be stayed.
622 P.2d at 1166.
In this case Appellant had abandoned the act and had
communicated to the remaining parties before they returned to
the victim's house that he wanted nothing to do with
burglarizing a house where someone was present (T. 588).
Appellant did enter the victim's house earlier in the evening
and is guilty of burglary.

There was no evidence offered to

prove that Appellant re-entered the house at the time the
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victim was assaulted other than the victim's suspect eyewitness
testimony.
This case requires especially close scrutiny of the
aiding and abetting instruction in light of the rather tenuous
identification of Mr. Cantu.

If the eyewitness identification

is to be believed, then the Appellant would be guilty as a
principal and the abetting instruction would have been
unnecessary and prejudicial, providing an unsupported, yet
alternate, basis for conviction.

If the eyewitness testimony

was not believed then the jury may have convicted the Appellant
as an aider and abettor even though there was no evidence that
he did in fact aid and abet.
In Napier v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 75, 206 S.W.2d 53
(1947) the court said (about jury instructions):
"A trial court, especially a regular circuit
judge, wields a tremendous influence on the
minds of jurors; and it is not unusual for a
jury to conclude that 'technical' rules of
evidence tend to suppress 'facts' which in
their opinion should be introduced in
evidence; and when the court instructs them
upon an issue concerning which no evidence
was introduced, jurors sometimes gather the
impression that the court is attempting to
point out the 'true facts' in the
unauthorized instruction. Oftentimes this
results in the jury's 'reading between the
lines' of the evidence and arriving at an
erroneous conclusion. Such being true, the
court meticulously should follow the
evidence in instructing the jury."
206 S.W.2d at 57.
In this case it is possible that the jury believed that there
was evidence of aiding and abetting because of the jury
instruction even though no such evidence was presented.
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As it is impossible to determine under which theory
the jury convicted the Appellant, this erroneous instruction
requires these convictions be reversed.

It seems inappropriate

to allow the state to argue throughout the trial that the
Appellant is the one who assaulted the victim because the
victim positively identified the Appellant but then say to the
jury that even if the Appellant wasn't the one who actually
assaulted the victim that he should nevertheless be found
guilty.

Either Juan Cantu attacked the victim or there is no

evidence that he was in the house at the time.

Allowing Jury

Instruction No. 28 unduly prejudiced him and reversal is
required.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ARRESTING JUDGMENT
OR MODIFYING JUDGMENT TO GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
WHEN APPELLANT WAS FOUND TO BE MENTALLY ILL PRIOR
TO SENTENCING,
During the course of the trial Appellant's counsel
became aware that Mr. Cantu was showing signs of mental
illness.

When his symptoms increased in severity after his

conviction, defense counsel asked that an alienist be
appointed.

The court consented and Dr. Breck LeBegue was

appointed.

He evaluated Appellant and found him to be mentally

ill (See Addendum B) .
Thereafter, Appellant's counsel made a motion to
arrest judgment under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-23 (1982 Supp.)
which provides:
§77-35-23. Rule 23 - Arrest of judgment. At
any time prior to the imposition of
sentence/ the court upon its own initiative
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may, or upon motion of a defendant shall,
arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense,
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there
is other good cause for the arrest of
judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court
may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the
offense charged is anew or retried, or may
enter any other order as may be just and
proper under the circumstances.
In this case Appellant is mentally ill as defined in
Utah Code Ann. §64-7-28(1) (1953 as amended), which provides:
(1) "Mental illness" means a psychiatric
disorder as defined by the current
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders which substantially impairs a
person's mental, emotional, behavioral, or
related functioning.
In this case, Utah Code Ann. §77-35-23 required the
trial court to arrest judgment because Appellant was mentally
ill at a time prior to the imposition of sentence.
Appellant requested that judgment be arrested or,
failing that, to modify the judgment from guilty to guilty and
mentally ill under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §77-35-21.5
(1983 Supp.) to make Appellant elligible for the treatment Dr.
LeBegue recommended.

The trial court's denial was error under

Utah Code Ann. §77-35-23 and this court should set aside the
judgment and order a new trial, unless the resolution of other
issues compels a more favorable result.
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CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant
seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of his case to the
District Court for dismissal of some or all charges and/or a
new trial, or a finding of guilty of burglary, a second degree
felony, (or guilty and mentally ill).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <s%JL day of July, 1986.

JO^AROL NESSET-SALE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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1

£ I 2 ^ E

2

MS. NESSET-SALE:

3

Nesset-Sale.

4

D I N G S

We could begin now.

I'm Jo Carol

I have requested this line up.

In addition to myself, David Walsh, Deputy County

5

Attorney, is present, as well as Sargeant Mallas from the

6 i Sheriff's Office, and eight gentlemen for this line up.
flR, WALSH:

7

And the record should also reflect that

8

you have arranged, have you not, Jo Carol, the arrangement as

9

you want then to be in?
!<TS . NESSEx-SALE:

10
11

Yes.

I have placed the eight

gentlemen in the positions that I'd like them to be in.

12

•ill each vnw in turn give us their name, age, height and

13

weight, aft^r Khich I might make some additional comments

14

about tne 3 irie up.

15

They

There are no other persons other than the named

16

persons presently in the room, except for the court reporter.

17

.MR. WALSH:

That's correct.

And let's start out,

18

we're all going to have to do the same thing, we're going to

19

ssk you tc keep your hands out at your sides.

20

out uov and all do that if you would, please.

21 j

So let's start

Gentleman number one, would you step forward,

i

22 ' f-le-ipp.

Would you tell us your nane.

23

GC"TLEf'AN NO. 1:

24

PR. WALSH:

25

COHLEflAN H O . 1:

My narue is Joe K. Anderson.

Your height, sir?
Is five eight.

COMPUTERISED TRANSCRIPT

MP, I*ALSH:

And your weight?

GENTLEMAN NO. 1:
MR, rALSH:

And your age?

GENTLEMAN NO. 1:
MR. WALSH:

About 162.

21.

Thank you.

MS. NESSET-SALE:

Mr. Anderson, are you an ethnic

GENTLEMAN NO. J.:

Excuse me?

MS- NESSET-SALE:

Are you white, are you Mexican?

GENTLEMAN NO. 1;

No, Ifm not Mexican.

MS, NESSET-SALE;

Are you white; do you consider

miner ity?

yourr3«lf caucasion?
CENTIEMAN NO. 1

No, I don't.

MS. NLS3ET-SALE

Uhat are you?

GENTLEMAN NO. 1

I'm Italian.

MS. NESSET-SALE

Okay.

MR. r,;ALSH:

All right.

Gentleman number two.

GENTLEMAN NO. 2:

Eddie Ramos, five ten and a half,

165, 38.
MR. WALSH:

All right.

MF, NESSET-SALE:
you ad 1 if JOJ are.
you ace Italian,

Thank you, sir.

And if you are a minority, would

If you are Mexican, if you are white, if

0*'jy.

MR. i.ALSHi

Are you, sir?

GENTLEMAN NO. 2:

Chicano.

COMPUTERIZED iRAKSCRIPT

5
MR. ,T7\LSH: All ric,ht.
MS. HESSET-SALE:

Number three.

GENTLEMAN NO. 3:

Runel Juan Martinez, five eight

a naif, lA'j

T

32, Spanish.

MR. WALSH:

!

Thank you.

GENTLEMAN NO. 4:

I

Gentleman number four.

Tony DeHerrerar, five eight, 33,

'

, Chic^ro.
MR. ' ALSH:

Thank you.

GENTLEMAN NO. 5:
five 11,

Gentleman number five.

Albert Lozano, I'm 32 years old,

160 pounds, and I'm Mexican.

MR, WALSH:

Thank y ° u /

sir

«

MS. NESSET-3?LE:

Number six.

GENTLEMAN NO. 6:

Juan Cantu.

MR„ WALSH:

IIP. WALSH:

|
|
I
I
I
J

Your age?

GENTLEMAN NO. 6:

I

35.

vour height?

GENTLEMAN' NO. 6:

Six foot.

I
!

MR. WALSH:

Your weight?

GENTLEMAN NO. 6:
MP. WALSH:

I

150.

j

All right.

I

MS. NESSET-SALE:

Are you Spanish?

|

GEHlLEMAli NO. 6:

Yes.

;

MR. WALSH:

All right.

Can we keep our hands to our

r-r, aentleiron, please.
Gentlenan number seven.

CONPUTERIZED II-ADSCRIPT
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GENTLEMAN NO. 7:

My name is Joe G. Trujillo, age

2 | 22, I <*eigh 140, and I'm Chicano.
3

MR. WALSH:

4

GENTLEMAN NO. 7:
MR« WALSH:

Your height, sir?
Six one.

All right.

Thank you.

Gentleman number

eight •
GENTLEMAN MO. 8:

Mike Valdez, 155, 18, five nine,

Chicane.
MR. WALSH:

Thank you, sir.

MS, NESSET-SALE:

My observations about the line up,

and if I could just see yourv arms, if you would keep your arms
at the side, is that number one is quite tattooed on both
arms, ^specially the left arm.
the V f t forearm and hand.
inside of the left forearm.
visible tattooes.

Number three is tattooed en

Number seven is tattooed on ti*e
They appear to be the only

As far as facial hair, number one has

goateo and mustache, two, a full mustache, three, full
mustache, four, the same, five, the same, six, a mustache and
sort :•* a straggly short beard, seven is clean shaven as is
number eighth

All gentlemen have dark brown hair, although

number six is considerably grayed.
bit o* gray, r\rl much.

Number four has a little

And the rest are dark hair.

Fhen the victim, alleged victim arrives, she's not
present ypt.

icu will not repeat what you've just done with

.your name and height.

That was just for the record.

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

What you

7
wilJ do r we'll have you do now, we'll have you practice since
she's not here.

And I'm going to have number one demonstrate

what v'ou are going to do.

If we do it and just listen

carefully and be serious, it won't take us long to get through
the line up.
I'll say number one, will you take one step forward.
Would ye: make a quarter turn to the left, quarter turn,
anotherf face forward. . Number one, will you now walk to the
spot in front of number eight, and face forward when you get
there

Would you now make those same quarter turns to the

left, back forward*

Would you now walk back to the spot in

frcpt of number one and face forward.
Number two, step forward.
turns to the left.

Step back, sir.
Would you make quarter

Would you now walk, sir, to the spot in

front of number eight and face forward.
NiKuber one, hands at your side, please.

Thank you.

Now slow quarter turns to the left, Eddie.

Would

you now walk back to the spot in front of number two and face
forward.

Step back.
Number three, step forward.

forward.

W7ait a minute.

You've got to keep your face looking ahead.

Face
Okay.

Now, would you make slow quarter turns to the left looking up.
That's good.

Would you now walk to the spot in front of

number eight and face forward.
left, sir.

Slow quarter turns to the

Vould you now walk back to the spot in front of
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numbet three rind face forward.

Step back.

Number four, step forward.
the left, sir.
face forward.

Thank you.

Slow quarter turns to

Walk to the spot in front of number eight,
Slew quarter turns to the left.

Face forward.

Walk back to the spot in front of number four and face
forward.

Step back.
Nov five through eight are going to be walking in

front to the spot in front of number one.

Okay.

Number five, will you step forward.
turns.

Face forward again.

front cf number one, sir.
around.

Fare forward.

front nf number five.

Would you now walk to the spot in

Face forward.

aay.

Face forward.

Keep neing, that's too slow.

Step back.
Slow quarter turns TZC the
But don't stay there all

Now walk to the spot in front of number one and face

forwaid.

Slew aa.ir*"pr turns to the left, sir.

again, again,
six*

Slow quarter turns

Would you now walk back to the spot in

number six, step forward.
Left-

Slow quarter

Keep going,

Would you walk to the spot in front of number

Ftep back.
Now we shouldn't have to say quarter turn left,

quarter turn left, quarter turn left.

Just once you've

started quarter turns, stop briefly, continue to turn.
number se^en, step forward.
Quarter turn** around.
one.

Face r o r vard.

Okay.

Hands at your side.

Walk to the spot in front of number

Quarter turns around.

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

Walk to the spot

in fr^nt of nuirher seven.

Face forward.

Step back, please

thank you.
And number eight, quarter turns.

Face forward.

Walk Lo the spot in front of number one, sir.
Quarter turns around.
eight*

Face forward.

Back to the spot in front of number

Step back.
Nov, if you are asked to say anything, you will do

that when you first step, forward.

It will be step forward,

repeat after me r and the statement will be given to you.

And

of course you'll have a chance to practice the statement so
that we can irake sure everybpdy is being appropriately
serious.

This is involving a first degree felony, so itfc a

sericur matter.

And we appreciate your willingness to be

series about it,
n a P c-he arrived yet?
KR. WALSH:
PS,

Yes.

NESSET-SALE:

tlR. WALSH:

Okay.

One other note, gentlemen.

don't do anything to draw attention to yourself.
everybody to look the same as much as possible.

That is,
We want
And we want

all of vou to act the same as much as oossible.

23

here?

24

M;. NESSET-SALE:

She's not here at this moment,

25

GENTLEMAN NO. 3:
GK!T

No, I mean

~

COMPUTERIZED TKANSCRIPT
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MS, NESSF'I-SALE:

2

IP involved.

7:e d o n ' t know i f

the actual

person

That's one of the things we're trying to find

3 J out, i^ if an identification can be made,
4 i

David, is there any special statement?

5

!IF. KALSH:

I don't know.

I'll go ask her.

But

6 | before we dof Jo Carol, do you have any objection to the
7 J constitution of the line up?
8

(MS. NESSET-SALE:

9

The line up is imperfect as all

line ups arer especially I think numbers one, two and eigftt

10

are not nearly as Hispanic looking as the rest of the line up.

11

But I'm also satisfied that Sargeant Mallas has done the best

12 , he car do with the jail population.

So I am satisfied with

13 I proce^ina rith the line up.
14

vr.

15

Ore other thing.

rALSHs

No objection to that?

I would prefer myself to co it

16 * since sh^'s going to be my witness.
17

All right.

I would like to have

theM, I irear giv? them directions.

18 j

VS.

NESSE1-SALE:

No problem.

But would you find

19 j cut fi^st if there is something to be said before they just —*
20

M R . WALSH:

I will.

Let me just ask Sergeant :or

21 j the »ecotd, Sergeant, is this the best we can do with the
22 j population?
23 |

SFROEAN! MALLAS:

It is, under the circumstances.

24 I Being P taller Hispanic, why they are usually shorter, and it

j
25 j was hcu-d encugh to get these people.
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MR, KALSH:

Thatfs all we need to get on the record.

MS- NESSET-SALE:
if there is a statement.

Just hang loose while we find out
If so, we'll practice that.

Number four, have you ever been in the military?
GENTLEMAN MO. 4:

No.

MS- ?JESSET-SALE:

You carry yourself as though ycu

are an ex-marine.
of the marine.

I just wondered.

A poster child, perhaps,

It will .just be a minute.

find out if there is a statement.

He's just going to

When you come back, make

sure you are on the same number you are on now.

Now that I've

played musical people.
(Off the record.)
f:S. NESSET-SALE:

f

Any statements?

i

MR. WALSH:

Yes.

"Where's your silver and where's
!

your e n d , you old son of a bitch."
I!S. NESSET-SALE:
the

I

And than is a statement made cy

same percon who hit her?
MR. WALSH:

|
j

Apparently.

KS. NESSET-SALE:

I want to make sure.

Can we bring

h3r in?
(Off the record.)
MR. !fALci:: Would you tell us, Mrs. Pippy, your full 1
naire, please.

Ke'rr on the record.

Ke have a court reporter

'>iitii -JS today and she's going to record the proceedings.

So
i

would you tell us your name, your full name and your address. (
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T!i

WITNESS:

My full name, you mean maiden name

2 j also?
3

MR, WALSH:

4

7HE WITNESS:

5

MR. WALSH:

6

No, just your first and last name now.
Adelia, A-d-e-1-i-a, Pippy, P-i-p-p-y.

Okay.

And you are the victim in this

case?

7 j

THE WITNESS:

8

MR. WALSH:

Yes.
I.guess we don f t need the address.

9 j Okay.
10 j

Nov;, Mrs, Pippy/ were some statements made to you

11 j during the course of this crime?
12

1HF PI1KES3:

13

MR. v'ALSH:

14 i

THE KlThESS:

15 1

HP. VALSH:

Oh yes.

I

Was more than one person involved?
There were two in my bedroom.
All right.

And there was a statement or j

|
16

i

I
a nun.her of statements made to you?

I

I

17!

THE WITNESS:

Oh yes, but they were all by the one

18 j chat hit ^e on the head.

'

19 i

!

MR. KALSH:

They were one and the same person that

20

made the statements and also hit you on the head; is that

21

true?

I

22

THE WITNESS:

(Witness nodding head.)

23

IIS. NESSE^ -SALE:

Can you tell me, did anybody else

24

2£r.a^ f any ct the other perpetrators, other than the one who

25

struck you, that you remember?
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i

I
lj
THE wiTKESS: No. The one standing to the side, I
2 | J coked tniouch my eye and I could see he had Levi's on. I
i

3 | could see a little bit of black hair.
4 j race.

But I could not see the

And I dicln't turn my head because somewhere throughout

5 1 my lifetime I've heard that if you are ever hit with a rock
6

or anything in the temple, there are certain spots on your

7 | head, that it would kill you, you know.
8 j

MR. WALSH:

N Q W the statement that was made, Mrs.

9 J ?ippy, was what?
10 j

THE WITNESS:

11 I uold,"

Ee said, "Where's your silver and your

I says, "I don't have any.

I live on Social

12 j Security."
13 j

MR. VCAL3H:

Okay.

14 j

MS, NESSET-SALE:

Is that when you were hit, then,

15 I :*£ter that statement was made?
16 I

THE FITNESS:

And I was hit on the head and I looked

17 I down end the club was broken right smack in two and laying on
18

the carpet in the bedroom.

19

MR, WALSH:

20 j

THE WITNESS:

21

MR. UALSH:

22

Now, did he call you a name, Mrs. Pippy?
He called me an old son of a bitch.

When did he say that in relationship to

when he as-f-ed where your silver and your gold was?

23 j

THE WITNESS:

24 i

MR, WALSH:

25

It was before.

So how did it go, how were the

statements made?
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THE WITNESS:

2

silver

3 |
4 J

and your

"You o l d

son of

a bitch,

where's

<;old»,!

!*S. N E S S E T - S A L E :

A n d then y o u w e r e s t r u c k w h e n y o u

said y o u d i d n ' t have a n y ; is that

5

THE WITNESS:

6

MR, hALSH:

7

M S . NESSET-SALE:

right?

I was hit on the head.
Okay.
Okay.

A n d t h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n

8 |

that the p e r s o n w h o irade. that s t a t e m e n t w a s t h e o n e w h o

9

clubbed you,

right?

10

THE WITNESS:

11

M S . NESSET-SALE;

12

your

No question at all.
Okay.

S o w e ' l l need t o h a v e

them

p r a c M ce that •

13 |

MFB VALSH:

Could we have y o u just step o u t again

i
i

14 1

into the c o r r i d o r , M r s . P i p p y ?

15 I

THE WITNESS:

16

M S . NESSET-SALE:

17 I
18

You bet you.

sen of a b i t c h , w h e e l ' s y o u r s i l v e r , I s u p p o s e , w h e r e f s
silver and ycur g o l d . W o u l d y o u a g r e e ?

19

PR. WALSH:

20

MS, NESSET-SALE:

21

24

your

Yes.
Ckay.

Could you have them come

back?

22
23

S o the s t a t e m e n t w i l l b e , y o u o l d

The victim has left the room, the record should
note.
Gentlemenf

just to let you know before Mr. Walsh

25 J says something, the victim is not in the room.
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1

original group here,
rher*3 was something that was said that each of you

2

3 J is going to ptnotice.
4

And Mr. Walsh will assist you and

listen carefully to what was said.

And for you to say it in

5 J the manner that it was certainly said to the victim, okay?
6 j

MR. KALSH:

Okay.

Now this is the quotation and we

7

want eich of ycu to say it when you step forward, when your

8

turn comes th° first time.
The statement is, "You old son of a bitch, where1s

9

10 I your silver and your gold.1'
11

MS. NESSET-SALE:

Got it?

Okay.

12

MR, faALSH: "You old sen of a bitch, where1s your
i

13 • silver and your gold."
14
15

Gentleman number one, would you step forward.
ycu sa\

CEU1LENAN hO. 1:

"Ycu old son of a bitch, where*s

your silver and your gold."

18 j
19

'Joule

that, please,

16 I
17

Okay.

MP. V'ALSh:

All right.

Thank you.

Would you step

back, please.

20 |

Centlenan number two.

21

GENTLEMAN NO. 2:

"You old son of a bitch, where1s

22 j your silver and your gold."
23 j

MS. NESSFT-SALE:

New let ire indicate this statement:

fH

24

was

aid just before this woman, elderly woman was clubbed in

25

the head.

So it v;as probably an angry statement followcc by
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1

ancuy *, iolence tcvard an old lady.

So none of you should

2 I there is nothing funny whatever about this.
3 I kind of spirit,
4

So say it in that

All right?

MR. KALSH:

5

—

Gentleman number two, do you want to try

it again.

6

GENTLEMAN NO. 2:

7

"You old son of a bitch, where 1 s

ycur silver and your gold."

8

MS. HESSET-SALE:

9

You've cot to be louder.

We can't

hear you.

10

I
GElsTLEMAN NC. 2:

11

"You old son of a bitch, whero's

your silver and your gold."

J

I

!

12
13

I

MS. HLSSET-SALE:

Not serious enough, gentlemen.

ihis lady was clubbed v/ithin an inch of her life and she's

14
entitled tc a fair chance to identify who might have done
15 1 that, It cculd have been your grandmother clubbed. All

*
i
i
[
i
i

16
17
18

right

Please r;ey this seriously.
CErTIEMAII HO. 2:

"You old son of a bitch, where's

your silver and your gold."
Okay.

MR. rALSH:

20

Gentleman number three.
GENTLEMAN NO. 3:
your silver and gold."

23

MR. WALSK:

Okay.

24 j

GEflTLEKAN HO. 3:

25 1

MR. WALSH:

!

|

19 J

21
22

«

Thank you.

|
j

"You eld son of a bitch, where's
;
"And your gold"
"And your gold."

All right.

Thank you.
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Gentleman number four.
GENTLEMAN NO. 4:

"You old son of a bitch, where's

ycur silver and- gold."
MR. WALSH:

Okay.

Say it with a little anger.

You've get to irean it, guys.
GEN'lLEMAN NO. 4:

"You old son of a bitch, where's

your geld ?nd silver."
MP. WALSH:

"Where's your silver and your gold."

MS. NESSET-SALE:
TiR. KALSH:

"Silver and your gold."

All right.

Now you are going to r.^ed to

practice,
GENTLEMAN NO. 5:

"You old son of a bitch, where's

ycur si Aver and your gold."
MS. MESSET-SALE:
MR. v\ALSH:

Okay.

Good.
Sir, "You old son of a bitch,

wh«rc'c ycur silver and your gold."
GENI'.EMAN NO. 6:

"You old son of a bitch, whe.-e's

}our silver and ycur gold."
MR, WALSH:

Okay.

GENTLEMAN NO. 7:

Thank you.
"You old son of a bitch, where*s

your rilver and gold."
MR. WALSH:

"And your gold."

GENTLEMAN 'TO. 7 :
MR. '-.ALSH:

"And y o u r

All r i g h t .

GENTLEMAN NO. 8 :

gold."

Thank

"Ycu o l d

you.

son of
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!

your silver av& your gold."
IIS. HFSSEl'-SALE:
HP. WALSH:

Good.

Thank you.

IIS. NESSET-SALE:
MR. WALSH:

I

j

Good.

|

Let me just tell you something, guys.

j

We've qot two people involved in this who have substantial
rights at stake.

\

We have a defendant and we have a victim.

And both have certain amount of rights and certain amount of
respect.

When she's in this room we only get one chance.

if somebody screws it up, we're all through.

And j

So don't screw

it up-

J
j

GFttHTEMAN NO. 3 :

Can you b r i n g one of u s a t a t i m e

j

i
jn h ^ e ; vcu]<i that be easier?
US. NESSET-SALE:

No. She needs to see all of ycu

to cc^prre heights and weights and sizes.
PR. WALSH:

Okay.

I

I'm serious about it. A whole

lot is at rtake.

'
•

hS. NESSET-SALE:

I wanted to ask her one more

question just about the voice before we do this.

We probably j

i
ought to just have them troupe in.
MR. WALSH:

Take them out, Sergeant.

riS. NESSET-SALE:
just c minute*
first- time.

i

Go on out.

j

We'll have you back in

P l e ^ e keep your voices up so we hear you the I

fhank you.

(Off the record.)
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MS, NESSET-SALE:

Back to the same seat, Mrs. Pippy.

Mrs. Fippy, one question I wanted to ask you before
I

3

™e bring in the group of men.

4

the voice, age, sex, if there was any accent of any kind or

5

dialect, you know, southern, Italian, Hispanic, white,

6

anything?

7

THE WITNESS:

Do you remember anything about

I don't remember any accent.

I knew

8

that it was a male voice and it was a male that hit me and it

9

was a man.

It wasn't any child.

10

MS. NESSET-SALE:

11

MR. PALSH:

12

MF. NESSET-SALE:

13 !

MR. WALSH:

All right.

Thank you.

Thank you.
Okay, Sergeant.

The record should reflect that we now

14 I have ^ e eight people who have beer* previously identified
15 i present.

v?« ^Iso have in the auditorium Mrs. Pippy.

16

G?ntl^menf we1re going to now go through what we

17

practiced befcrs*

We'd ask you to keep your hands at your

18

cide^ and n^t draw attention to yourselves.

When we go

19 ; through this, we'll do it one at a time as we did.
20

And we'd

ask you to say the statement, "You old son of a bitch, where's

21 i your silver and your gold."

I
22 |
pleasr:
23
24 i

O^ay. Gentleman number one, would you step forward,
Would you riy that statement.
GENTLEMAN HO. 1:

"You old son of a bitch, where's

25 i your silver and your gold."
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20
MR, WALSH:
left, sir.
another.
pleaye.

Would you make a quarter turn to your

Another quarter turn, another quarter turn, and

Would iou step to the far end of the platform,
Would you make successive quarter turns, please.

Would ycu please step to this end of the platform.

Thank you.

Gentleman number two, would you step forward anc
say, "You old son of a bitch, where1s your silver and your
gold."
GENTLEMAN NO. 2:

"You old son of a bitch, wherefs

ycur silver and your cold."

I
MR. WALSH:
plea*---.

Would you make successive quarter turns, i

Woul^ you step to the far end of the platform.

you Fake successive quarter turns.
to this spotf sir.

Would i

Would you please step back ;

Thank you.

[

Gentleman number three, would you step forward and
<ray, "'You eld son of a bitch, where's your silver and youi

i
!

gold. "'
GENTLEMAN NO. 3:

"You old son of a bitch, where's

your silver ar»d your gold."
MR. WALSH:
end.

Okay.

Would you please step to that far

Thank vcuP sir.
j

Would you step forward, number four.
vr

\ou old

Please say,

son of a bitch, where1 s your silver and your gold."

i
|
i

GENTLEMAN NO. 4:

"You old son of a bitch, where's

your silver and your gold."
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HR. WALSH:
p1ease•

Would you make successive quarter turns,

Would ycu p1o../c ?*t- .

sir .
G e n t l e m a n number : : v
5 j s"i\" >
6 J

y o u

•7I '

•

'

- • : •.

G E N T L E M A N M O . 5:

your si ] ver and your goiu.J

9

.

11 j
12

„ w h e r e 1 s yoi lr si ] /ei: ai id

*

8!

1G |

wo a 1 d y o u st e p fo rwa rd and

!m

WALSH:

"You o l d s o n of a b i t c h ,

where's

Thank y o u , s:r.

G e n t l e m a n number s i x , wc«Ic y o u step f o r w ^ - ,
f

v o u 1 6 v c;:I - a y f " Y o u i) ] c:i s o n o f a 1: • i t c i : * h e r e ' s

?nd ycur g o l d , "

13 |

GENTLEMAN NO. 6:

"" You old son of a bltci: I, Where's

14 | your s i l v e r silver and your gc- d."
15 |

HP., W A L S H :

W o u l d y o u r a k e q u a r t e r •-urnr

please.

16 1 W o u l d y o u step to this end of the p l a t f o r m , m a k e s u c c e s s i v e
17

quarter turns, pleas e ,

18 j s p o t .
19 j

0 k a y.

W:

Thank y o u , s i r .
Gentleman number seven, w c , id you please step

20 j

f o r w a r d arid s a \

21

silver and jSJUL
your Mg Uo _Ll Ud .. "

i t c I: I , \ h e r e ' s \ o a r

j: 1 e a s e , "

|

I

22
23
24 I
25

GENTLEMAN UQ. 1 :
your *_-j».i-er and ycu
MR. WALSH;

"You old sen of a bitch, where'£

gold."
Would you make successive quart*- : l urns,

Would you no'; please step tc this end of the plati^*.^.

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

i.ai^e

j
1

22
successive quarter turns, please.

2

Thank you, sir.

Gentleman number eight, would you step forward,

3

plea?^, and say, "You old son of a bitch, where's your silver

4 | m d your gold."
5

GENTLEMAN HO. 8:

6

"You old son of a bitch, where's

your silver and your gold."

7

MP. WALSH:

All right.

Would you make successive

8

quarter turns, please. .Would you step to this end of the

9

platform.

10

right.

Make successive quarter turns, please, sir.

All

Thank you.

I

i
11
Mrs. Pippy, if you recognize somebody there, can you I
12 | see all the numbers on the bottom of the floor where they are {
i

I

13
14

t

standino?
THE WITNESS:

Yeah, I see the numbers.

j
t
i

15

MP. WALSH:

All right.

If you recognize somebody,

16 j would you reiaember what their number is, and we're going co

j

17

j

have them leave new,

18

MS, NESSET-SALE:

Let me just ask Mrs. Pippy, have

19

you nac! enough time to see them?

20

throuoh the walk or the speech aoain, or have you had enough

I
21 I
I
22 [

Do you need them to go

j

"

\

i
I

tims to see if you recognize anybody?

!

~

MR. WALSH:

i

We need to know only, Mrs. Pippy, if

j
i

23

mere time will help you.

If it won't help you, that's the

24 1 only rhing vt need to know.
25

just need —

We don't want any numbers.

no you understand what I'm asking?

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

We

If you need

j

23
some more time, we can give you some more time.

That's, all

we're talking about here , is if you need addi11ona 1 time.
MS • NESSET-SALE i
have him do seme thine.

We can ' t pi ct< o n \ : : f tl :ten: \ o\ 11 i mc

But if you want: to see them all S"cep

forward agai n o r v a 1 k a g a i n , we c a n d o t h a t,

01: I f y c u w o u 1 d

1 ike to hear' eacI i oI: 11 i.ern speak t• ::: ;;r: • ::: i i ai id irtake that statement
again, we can have theirs, do that.

Would that be helpful or

have they helped you a 1 ] that the} can?
THE WITKESS :

Ther e i : ; c i: :i 1 y thr ee I 1 at ai " e

M S . NESSET-SALE;

—

We can talk about them after

they've left the room and you are given a card.

Is it all

?
THE WITNESS;

Oh y e s .

MS. NESSET-SALE:

We have not yet had the

photograph. I.' d i n 6 i c a t e .
MR, WALSH:

Maybe we better save them, for a minute

until we finish this,
MS . NESSE1 - SALE i

Save i I iei i i ! ;ack 11: ier< ; :, "

Thank you, gentlemen.
'vs.

MR. WALSH
I den ' t know if you

?i>:'\

. t--. .• . ;, \ *

:

.. -his card.

.

i i :e give

you my pen, And would you write you, name a- * ."-

up of that,

please.
THE WITNESS:

Th^re^aaiLLt- *ny rvf fhn^p

white,

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

th^l^Lf

24

lj

his.

2

FESSET-SALE:

I'm s o r r y ,

I d i d n ' t h e a r what s h e

sa id.

3 J
4

MR. WALSH:

I don't want to talk to you anymore.

Let's just fill the card out.

5 i

THE WITNESS:

6

MS, NESSET-SALE:

7

Okay?

Okay.
And that's if you recognize any

one or more persons, you should note the number down.

8

MR. WALSH:

9

We're just going to go through the first

part here first.

10

THE WITNESS:

11

I couldn't say right now if I

recognized any.

12 j
13

MR. WALSH:

We're just going to fill in the top

portirn of th^ card first.

14 |

1HE WITNESS:

15

MR. WALSH;

16

Let's see, today is the 13th.
August 13th, okay.

cas<= PMin^er blank on that.

You can leave tJr.e

Now, you see that box down at the

17 1 bottom of the card there, Mrs. Pippy?

Now, if there is

18 j somebody that you recognized there as being the one who cid
19

this to you that night, then write his number there.

If you

20 | don't recognize anybody, then either v/rite a zero or just

|
j
!

21

I

leave it- blank.

22

j

7HE WITNESS:

It didn't look like any of these guys, ,

23 j zjallJL~
24 I
25 j

MR, WALSH:
neeo

c

Okay.

orr.e t i ^ e t o t h i n k ,

I d o n ' t v/ant you t o t a l k .

that's

fine.

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

If

you

25
lj

THE WITNESS:

Can I think a little o-

—

!

2 j

M S . NESSET-SALE:

I

3J

the s e r i e s c i

(

^i-v '

4 j the person w h o w a s . .
**i; i !"

statement

A n d t h i s ; ..: r e a , : y s e p a r a t e

g r o u p ,*•».•"

•

• *'

.-* ....

J

"
^

from

aoou:

. • .^ ; ^ce that

. ;*«r. .cent:; _ that p e r s o n freir t: : s
^-

*

identify that p e r s o n ac ot;;.c ./: ...~

-an f t

.
* '

-.IO*.-.

Walsh

s a y s , that's w h e n y o u JLeave I: clan./. » : p u t .. z e r o .
THE WITNESS:

Thi ; j gi /; / I s. iw

10 I

M S . NESSET-SALE:

11 j

THE WITNESS.

. m sorr:

—

T

r r

u

hoar vcu.

:his i d l c v ; : n -.'.^ T.ucshct, r.is h a i r

12 j was a Jittie dit:-. *

* •

'his

13 j line- u p .
14 j
15 j

M S ,NESSET-SALE:

:!' c'r.cerred

.

.re f o c u s i n g o n

the mug shot instead ^

16 1 back t o that n i q h t .

*
N o t t h e s e r i e s of

17

That a p p a r e n t l y

i s ' " o n i u s i o g ' - ...

18 |

they were o n l y from t h e chest, up.

19

THE WITNESS:

20 I

MS, NESSET-SALE:
:

The l e n g t h ,

T

—-j

ictc::^

VCJ'VO

wore c l a c ; . and

This i s real

/rhite,

] I fe.

Ar:< 3 ti: 1:1 1 ik

' 1 1 d i t f s o k a y e i 11 1 e 1: w a y

' o k a \•

a b c M t t h a t nigh t:

22 j

identify somebody and it's okay not to, whatever.
THE WITFESS:

L e t ' s s e e , I s a w h i m from, here

2 4 I w a s n ' t l o o k i n q down,- I w a s 1 o o k i n g at the f a c e ,
25

^:en.

yes.

21

23 j

Think

up,

II1 ,. 1 ess h 1 s

hair h a s c h a n g e d , w h i c h here y o u g o back to that m u g s h o t , I

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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spy thai- coat was only about that wide.

He wasn't husky, if

you knew what J mean.
MR. WALSH:

j
Yes, I see.

MS. NESSET-SALE:

I

The only question, though, Mrs.

!

Pippy, do you recognize the face of one of these eight men as
being the face of the man who said those things to you and who
hit vou with the club?
leave this blank.

If you don't see the face up here,

|

If you see the face, put the number down.

THE WITNESS:

T r.-n't ^ay thrlt T ? a "

¥h

*<-

f

*^

in

!

that line up.

*

MR. WALSH:

All right.

MS, "ESSET-SALE:

That's fine.

j
;

MP. WALSH: So you could just leave it blank. Okay.
Cc you want to step outside into the corridor, Mrs. Pippy?
s

Thank you.

!

1HE WITNESS:

I don't want to send the wrong mar. up. j

MS. NESSET-SALE:

No, we'd like to send the right

I

man U P , net the wrong man.
THE WITNESS:
hjjn, because I know one

3y colly, I want to make sure I name

thing, someone will be killed by him. j

MS, NESSET-SALE:
possibility.

Well, I'm sure that that's a real

Thank you for coming down, Mrs. Pippy.

THE WITNESS:

j

I'm only too happy to.

MS. NESSET-SALE:

I'll see you next week at the

hearing.

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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I

THE WITNESS:

You bet.

MS. NESSET-SALE:

Arvwov vo>, w.-=nt.

7 : hi

you, ma'am,
THE WITNESS:

\'cu LL ...

MS. NESSET-SALE:

That's all right.

Evo P-w , M • n . P i ppv

I hope you

are feeling a little stronger.
7

THE WITNESS:

8

(Or! ' • " record.)

9

MR. WALSH:

1G

It ta

• entlerr.er., ycu rid ve~- •:^. "

appreciate your help.

11

Than,-; y c .

(At this tin>

12 J

Rick Somers

13 !

of Sergeant Mai las.)

14
•i

!
15 j

is now

taking

(The. prcceec;

__.7.e.

'

:: 'er

two p h o t o g r a p h s under

clucec
* * *

16 1
i

17 t
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

the

)

direction
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C E R T I F I C A T E

S1ATL OF UT/»H
;s.
CCUN1Y OF SALT LAKE)

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the line-up, at the Salt
Lake Jeilf in the line-up named, was taken before me, Diane
!!. Winter, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in
and for the State of Utah, residing at Salt Lake City, Utah.
T!i3t the said witnesses, were by me, before
exairi nation, *nly sworn "to testify the truth, the whole truth,
and nochirg but the truth in said cause.
That the testimony of said witnesses were reported
by we in Stenotvpe, and thereafter caused by me to be
transcribed into typewriting, and that a full, true and
'-nrr°ct transcription of 'sard testimony so taken and
tranccribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered from
^ to ?7f inclusive, and said witness deposed and said as in
the t"regoing annexed deposition.
I fJither rertify that I am not of kin or otherwise
arso' ^" *ec! *'*th any cf the parties to said cause of action,
and th-»t T an not interested in the event thereof.
j|

wrirESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City,
Utah, this l^th day of October, 1935.

' **

V\> Jc-vt nii «3jf xppu „EKP i r e s :

DIANH I«I. WINTEK,
Utah License No.

LINE-UP INSTRUCTIONS
DATE: ^

c-

SIGNATURE:

s

^ c U k t ^ ^ 9 ^

CASE K-'vi:•<'

this line-up a: the individual v ^ o l v e u
crime, please mark

.

• *;n^ tc JZC* below t i e ;iu...

the per
I f you *iv .IOL recognize anyone parti c i ,1-u" i"u in this line-up, please leave the space
1 "ilH,

ADDENDUM ",

!

DfPAPTMSNT
Of PSYCHtArfiY
S C K X X OP MFC'C N8

OF UTAH

50 N O ^ H MED-CAL D&'vE
SALT ^A*f CiTY U ' A M 84132
801 5fit 7Q51

December !.'• », 1935

Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Third District Court Judge
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RE?

Juan Cantu
CR 85-10&7

Pursuant to cout'* n^l«r imder UOA 71-I5«!> I evaluated Juan Cantu, recently
convictsd of aggravated burglary, robbery and assault, in the Salt Lake
County Jail on December 6, 1985 for one and a quarter hours. In addition I
reviewed fhe criminal information of the Salt Lake City Police DepartE<;nt
investigation report of the crimes on December 22, 1984. Also, I spoke with
M s «jiflt?r Coring Mantis and another sister's cother-in-law (al io an
acquaintance) Qclidaa Chicon.
ISSUES:
1)

Whether the defendant 1 s presently mentally il 1.

2) Whether the defendant is presently competent to procede to sentencing,
i.e. whet-her he, by reason of mental disease or deficit, is unable to
comprehend the punishment specified for the offense charged, or unable," to
assist hts counsel at the sentencing hearing,
.?"> Wieth?r the defendant was codating his District Court trial.
OPINIONS:
1) The defendant presently appears to be* suffering from a psychotic mental
illness of undetermined type* probably acnizophrenia.
2) Even though mentally ill, he is nevertheless competent to procede " o
sentencing, as be has ft full appreciation of the nature and consequencas of
tho sentencing procesn, and the punishment specified for the offense of
vhich hf» ••fne ccnvic':«d.

Jyjn Cantu
D^cc^bsr 10, 1905
P??:« ?
J) Likewipe, it appears that even though mentally ill during his trial, he
wasi nevertheless able to comprehend uhe nature of the procedings against
him, and was able to assist his counsel in his defense in rational ways, not
withstanding ^om^ irrational behavior during trial such as providing Bible
verses to his attorney.
DATA AND REASONING:
Juan Cantu is a 35 year old man convicted of aggravated burglary, robbery,
and assault, in a trial during which evidence clearly placed him at the
sc*ne of the crime* He presently denies any guilt; although this denial is
common in many if not most convicted felons, I believe it to be a symptom of
his psychotic process as well.
Because the focus of my evaluation is his present mental state, I explored
this to a greater extent than past history. However, contributing to this
present understanding is the fact that he was hospitalized in a psychiatric
hospital in San Antonio when he was a young teenager for approximately six,
months. I pither he nor his sister can give me a diagnosis nor kind of
treatment offered at that time.
He states that he was educated through the sixth or seventh grade, but later
received hl3 GED while in prison. Past crimes have included drunk driving,
the rape of a child (for which he served seven years), and attempted burglary.
\IH admits to an alcohol and drug history, consuming up to a "lid" of marijuana a day at times in the past.
During imprisonment in Texas for the sexual assault of the child, he stated
th« »ie hallucinated the voice of God and the voices of others, and became
severely depressed to the extent he attempted to hang himself. He describes
an extensive retreat Into hyperreligiostty during that imprisonment, for
which he was treated with the anti-psychotic medication Thorazine.
His present conversation is full of references to religious experience, such
as hearing the voice of Jesus, seeing him in visions, and a over concern
with religious work which he feels called to do. Specifically, he believes
that he has been called to minister to criminal men from broken families,
and he plans to do this on the street if granted probation.
Present Competency:
I ec>pha8J?e the contingency, because, although his verbal productions are
full of references to the Hallucinated (I believe) voice of Jesus, he is
able to maintain the perspective that he has been convicted of a serious
crime, is required to appear in court before an earthly Judge for sentencing
for that crin*; appreciates the purposes of sentencing, and the potential
choices the judge night have (imprisonment, probation, 90 day evaluation,
etc.); understands the possible length of time he could be Imprisoned, and
finally the f-?ct that he would be imprisoned as a punishment for a crime of
which he w?« convicted, rather than sent to the prison on a special religious mission*

j u i n rar*ru
Pecctatei 10, 198S
Page 3
The latter is important., because although he states that he will speak to
others in prison about his religious beliefs, he would obviously prefer to
carry on his life on the streets, ;nd does not specifically carry the
psychotic delusion that he is being imprisoned either for his religious
beliefs, or for the purpose of carrying out his ministry.
Mental status examination during interview showed him to be alert oriented
snd cooperative. He answered my questions appropriately, psychotic behavior
did not intrude upon the purpose of our evaluation (although it was obvious
he much preferred to discuss his religious beliefs than to discuss the
sentencing and possible imprisonment); and from his ability to cooperate
with the intent of my interview, I must infer that he is able to do likewise
with his attorney at sentencing.
Past Competency Inferred:
Although his psychotic religious beliefs intruded on his discourse with his
attorney, they apparently did not substantially interfere with the process
of defense, and were not disruptive at trial.
The possibility regains that his presence at his trial was purely physical,
in that he wag mentally preoccupied with his religious beliefs or even that
be believed on the ba«is of a delusional system that he must remain uninvotved or even conceal exculpatory information. If information is available
which ir? contradictory to my inferred opinion, such information must be
given greater weight and credibility. Of particular importance is his
actual behavior at trial, in the experience of both counsel and the court.
Prognosis ond Treatment:
Delu?ior.nl pnychones occurring during incarceration are not uncommon, are
more frequent in these genetically and biochemically predisposed to thu
illness schizophrenia, and psychodynamically may be thought of as occurring
in order to ^ard off overwhelming feelings of guilt, remorse and selfloathing, the severity of which may culminate in suicide*attempts as they
have in the past with this defendant.
Treatment of the illness consists of anti-psychotic medication, which may be
made available in prison, or as an outpatient as a condition of probation.
Prognosis is poor. His self described religiosity in the past has not lead
to significant decrease in criminal behavior, and is unlikely to do so in
the future*
Further, because the experience is so intensely rewarding - few can claim
the privilege of hearing Jesus* voice actually spoken aloud - he is unlikely
to recognize his psychotic illness for what it is. Unfortunally the illness
is likely to progress tc severe depression and potential self destruction as
it h«m in the past, so close observation and treatment are in my opinion
mandatory.

Juan f^ntu
December ! C
Page 4

1985

Thank >ou for ths opportunity to examine this defendant.
Questions please call me*
Sincerely,

/>^C'/f

-J.c

it*U<*

{/

&

flrsck Lebegue, M.D"
Assistant Clinical Professor
Director Forensic Psychiatry Service
Diplomat*, American Board of Psychiatry
and Neurology
Diplomats, American Board of Forensic
Psychiatry
cc:

BL/cL

Jo Carol Fesset-Sale
Ted Cannon

If you have any

ADDENDUM C

TABLE 4
POPULATION BY RACE (INCLUDING SPANISH ORIGIN) AND COUNTY
OF RESIDENCE: UTAH, CENSUS, APRIL 1 , 1980

DISTRICT
AND
COUNTY

WHITE

TOTAL

1,461,037

TOTAL

DISTRICT
DISTRICT
DISTRICT
DISTRICT
DISTRICT
DISTRICT
DISTRICT
DISTRICT

1
2N
2S
3
4
5
6
7

r,>

E VER
E-. . ELDER
CrCHE
C" ".BON
DAGGETT
DAVIS
C CHESNE
EMERY
C RFIELD
GRAND
: ON
JUAB
KANE
MILLARD
MORGAN
PIUTE
RICH
SALT LAKE
SAN OUAN
SANPETE

SEVIER
SUMMIT
TOOELE
UINTAH
UTAH
WASATCH
WASHINGTON
WAYNE
WEBER

1,382,550

92,498
296,073
645,099
236,827
47,087

55,489
33,840

54,124
4,378
33,222
57,176
22,179
769
146,540
12,565
11,451
3,673
8,241
17,349
5,530
4,024
8,970
4,917
1,329
2,100
619,066
12,253
14,620
14,727
10,198
26,033
20,506
218,106
8,523
26,065
1,911
144,616

88,386
278,264
607,840

229,815
45,869
54,279
31,261
46,836

NUMBER OF PERSONS AMD RACE1
AM. INDIAN ASIAN AND
ESKIMO AND
PACIFIC
OTHER
BLACK
ALEUT
ISLANDER

9,225

19,256
1,508
1,512
4,694
1,985
533
758
2,245
6,021

224
,460
,224
158
28
32
8
91

4,316
11
30,863
213
55,449
- 78
21,231
767
138,365 2,235
2
12,175
11,214
1
3,589
2
7,966
18
36,782
5,461
1
3,963
1
8,557
1
4,845
1,321
2,074
583,962 4,056
6,425
11
14,192
24
14,452
10,073
7
23,878
168
18,319
6
211,320
148
8,422
3
25,629
12
1,886
2
135,054 2,225

27
1,294
206
137
1
754
292
120
66
164
372
47
38
137
22
5
8
4,324
5,'600
148
178
45
370
1,952
1,879
61
255
16
726

PERSONS OF SPANISH ORIGIN MAY BE OF ANY RACE.
1 O

15,076
1,065
3,144
8,163
2,019
222
174
77
208
24
375
6B7
74
I
1,709
25
57
9
37
61
4
5
135
20
1
7
8,021
40
60
20
27
142
47
1,979
13
75
2
1,415

SPANISH
ORIGIN

34,930

60,302

1,311
8,693
20,178
2,850
435
245
2^
968

2,023
14,055
33,262
5,365

11
679
621
659
3,477
67
60
8
72
116
17
17
140
30
2
11
18,703
177
196
77
46
1,475
152
2,760
24
94
:,186

696

704
755
3,442
85
1,299
708
2,423
13
5,436
.177
233
36
353
239
55
46
157
49
17
16
30,867
433
268
175
204
2,395
565
5,040
121
298
24
8,570

ADDENDUM D

1. General
a.

Juror is disqualified from serving in any case:
i

Felony conviction

ii,

Want of any legal qualification rendering a person
a competent juror.

iii. Unsoundness of mind or body rendering him incapable
of performing juror duties (17-30-17, Utah Code
Annotated)
2. Particular
a.

Juror is disqualified from serving in action on trial
i

Implied bias
(a)

Existence of facts ascertained renderning
juror's mind contra to impartiality.

(b)

Existence of stare of juror's mind contra to
Impartiality (77-30-18, Utah Code Annotated)
III
JURY SELECTION -- MECHANICS

After each side has exercised both preemptory challenges and
challenge? for cause, if any, the panel will be selected. In
misdemeanor matters, the jury panel may consist of four jurors
and in felony matters of eight jurors.
In making challenges, the baliff will hand the attorney for the
defendant first a card bearing the names of all of the jury
panel; at which time counsel for the defense will strike his
fir.?r preemptory challenge indicating that it is defendant's
number one challenge and placing his initials after the challenge.
Th° card v? 11 then be passed to the State who will exercise his
first pre'n.pfcory challenge in the same fashion and this will
occ^ until the specified number of preemptory challenges have
bee: exercised. The panel will then be selected and sworn.
Jur^; Qualifications
1. While there is no specific rule as to which individuals make
good jurors favorable to the prosecution, as a general rule,
the following classifications can be asserted generally:
a. Technical professionals

Good jurors

b.

Poor jurors

School teachers

c

Minorities

Poor for blue collar crimes

d

Minorities

Good for white collar crimes

e

Physically infirmed

Good jurors

f

The very young

Poor jurors

g

The very old

Good jurors

h

Caveat

Watch for hearing problems

i

Civil service

Good jurors

J

Ex-military

Good jurors

k

Artists and Musicians

Poor jurors

1

Bartenders

Poor jurors except on robbery

m

Insurance men

Very good jurors

n

People wearing sunglasses

Poor jurors

o

Some law training

Poor jurors

P

social workers

Poor jurors

AS A <JLNE?AL RULF ALWAYS GET RID OF THE ODD JUROR, I.E.
.IBBER, HUPY TYPES, THE REVOLUTIONARY, ETC,

WOMEN' S

AS A RULE OF THUMB, WHEN IN DOUBT -- STRIKE
C.

The Voire Dire
1.

Voire Pire examination in Utah courts is generally done by
the trial judge. Many prosecutors tend to let the judge do
all of fhe work, but there may be certain questions thau
the judge will not ask or not ask properly that the prosecutor will want to ascertain. The prosecutor may ask the
qMestion? himself, but more properly he should request of
the Court that a specific question be asked the individual
juror or the panel in general. A prosecutor should be particularly mindful of the following kinds of cases and proceed
with a more detailed and complex voire dire if you feel
that the judge has not properly examined the panel. The
following kinds of issues should be dealt with some care on
voire dire:
a.

Qualification in capital cases.

b.

Circumstantial evidence, i.e., not second class evidence

(16)

ADDENDUM E

INSTRUCTION NO. 2^6
You are instructed that not only every person who
directly connits the criminal act, but also any person, acting
with the rrental state
offense, who

solicits,

required

for ther commission

requests,

commands,

intentionally aids another person to engage

of the

encourages

or

in the conduct

which constitutes an offense, shall be criminally liable as
a party fcr such conduct.

ADDENDUM F

Photo of Juan Cantu

W- S A L , " -MCECO'-'NTY

M< SHLRII-i J DLPT.
S L C UI

*P&ii2lb
Photo Mrs. Pipr-y identified ns her assailant (T.300)

